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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal has its genesis in social legislation enacted 
by Congress designed to encourage states to provide 
meaningful education to individuals with disabilities. The 
specific question before us is whether the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C.S 1400 et 
seq., requires a Pennsylvania school district to provide a 
student with disabilities who relocates from another state 
with an interim educational program identical to the 
program the student received in his or her prior state of 
residence. Michael C., a student with disabilities, attended 
a private school in Washington, D.C. under an 
Individualized Education Plan ("IEP") formulated by 
Washington educational authorities. Michael and his father 
moved from Washington to Radnor Township, Pennsylvania 
in the summer of 1997, and requested special educational 
treatment from the Radnor Township School District 
("Radnor"). Radnor responded with specific educational 
proposals but Michael's father rejected them, and 
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unilaterally placed Michael in a private school. Michael 
remained in this school for 41 days, after which his family 
again moved, this time to New Jersey. 
 
Michael's father later initiated administrative proceedings 
seeking reimbursement for tuition costs incurred while 
Michael attended the private school in Pennsylvania. After 
unsuccessfully pursuing his administrative remedies, 
Michael's father filed this action in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
against Radnor and the Pennsylvania Department of 
Education ("PDE"), seeking tuition reimbursement and 
claiming violations of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. S 1415(j), the 
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. S 794, and the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871, 42 U.S.C. S 1983. He also claimed that Michael's 
and his family's right to travel interstate under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
had been violated. On cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the district court entered summary judgment in 
favor of Radnor and PDE as to all claims. The court also 
granted PDE's separate motion for dismissal of theS 1983 
claim as to it based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. 




The facts of this case are undisputed. Michael, 17 years 
old at the time events relevant to this case occurred, is 
learning disabled and suffers from severe hemophilia. Prior 
to August 1997, Michael and his father lived in Washington 
D.C. Pursuant to the IDEA, Washington public educational 
authorities had developed an IEP2 for Michael.3 This IEP 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 20 U.S.C. S 1415(i) (formerly 20 U.S.C. S 1415(e)) and 28 
U.S.C. SS 1331 and 1343. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
2. The IEP is the "centerpiece" of the IDEA. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 
305, 311 (1988). " `The IEP consists of a detailed written statement 
arrived at by a multi-disciplinary team summarizing the child's abilities, 
outlining the goals for the child's education and specifying the services 
the child will receive.' " Oberti v. Board of Educ. of Borough of 
Clementon 
Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1213 n.16 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Polk v. 
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recommended placement at a "public/private separate 
school." (A.185a). Accordingly, Michael attended a small 
private school for learning disabled students called the LAB 
School. The LAB School served only students with 
disabilities, and therefore its students were segregated from 
their non-disabled peers. Michael attended the LAB School 
for three years. 
 
When Michael and his father moved to Pennsylvania in 
1997, the father contacted Radnor educational authorities 
to obtain appropriate placement for Michael. Radnor 
convened an "IEP meeting" to develop an interim program 
for Michael for the 1997-98 school year. At this time, 
Radnor had not yet completed its own evaluation of 
Michael's educational needs. By letter dated August 26, 
1997, Radnor offered Michael two interim programming 
options pending completion of its own evaluation of 
Michael's needs. Both of these options placed Michael at 
Radnor High School ("Radnor High"), a large public high 
school with a total enrollment of approximately 800 
students, where Radnor believed it could effectively 
implement the substance of Michael's Washington IEP. The 
first option, which Radnor characterizes as the"learning 
support" or "LS" option, involved enrolling Michael in 
mainstream English, science, social studies and elective 
classes, and in special education mathematics and written 
expression classes. This option also involved provision of 
support for homework and test preparation, and the 
development of study skills through a special education 
resource program. The second option, which Radnor 
characterizes as the "emotional support" or"ES" option, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 173 (3d 
Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989)). It "must include, among 
other things, a statement of the child's current level of educational 
performance, annual goals for the child, specific educational services to 
be provided, and the extent to which the child will participate in regular 
educational programs." Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. 300.346, subsequently 
recodified at 34 C.F.R. S 300.347 by 64 Fed. Reg. 12405, 12442 (Mar. 
12, 1999)). 
 
3. Under the IDEA, Washington, D.C. is considered a "State." 20 U.S.C. 
S 1401(27). 
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involved enrolling Michael in an "Emotional Support 
Program" for English, science, social studies, health and 
physical education classes, in "learning support" for 
mathematics, and in mainstream elective courses. 
 
Michael's father rejected these options, and unilaterally 
decided to place Michael at the Hill Top School, a small 
private school for children with disabilities. In the fall of 
1997, before Radnor had completed Michael's evaluation, 
Michael and his father again relocated, this time to New 
Jersey, for reasons related to the father's job. Michael had 
attended Hill Top for 41 days, during which time his father 
incurred tuition expenses in the amount of $4299.31. 
Because Michael left Pennsylvania before Radnor officials 
had completed their own evaluation of Michael's 
educational needs, Radnor never developed its own IEP for 
Michael. 
 
In January 1998, after moving to New Jersey, Michael's 
father initiated a due process hearing in Pennsylvania as 
provided for by the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. S 1415(f). The purpose 
of this hearing was to determine whether the IDEA required 
Radnor to reimburse the father for the cost of Michael's Hill 
Top tuition. Both the local hearing officer and later the 
Pennsylvania Special Education Appeals Panel rejected the 
father's request. Both relied on a policy memorandum of 
the United States Department of Education's Office of 
Special Education Programs ("OSEP") stating that when a 
disabled student moves from one state to another, the new 
state of residence is not required to adopt and implement 
the most recent IEP developed for the student by the 
previous state of residence. 
 
The plaintiffs then instituted the present action against 
Radnor and PDE. PDE moved to dismiss their S 1983 claim 
against it based on the Eleventh Amendment. In addition, 
the parties agreed that all claims could be decided on the 
administrative record without further evidence, and cross- 
moved for summary judgment. On February 5, 1999, the 
district court granted PDE's motion to dismiss the S 1983 
claim as to it, and also granted the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment as to all claims and denied the 
plaintiffs' cross-motion, relying heavily on the OSEP policy 
memorandum. 
 




Although plaintiffs, Michael C. and his father, claimed 
numerous statutory violations and one constitutional 
violation in the district court, on appeal they seek relief on 
only two of these grounds. First, they contend that the 
IDEA's "pendency" or "stay-put" provision, 20 U.S.C. 
S 1415(j), required Radnor to implement Michael's 
Washington IEP. Second, plaintiffs argue that Radnor's 
refusal to implement Michael's Washington IEP violated his 
and his family's constitutional right to interstate travel. We 
exercise plenary review over the district court's order 
granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. See 
W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 493 (3d Cir. 1995). The 
material facts being undisputed, we therefore address 
plaintiffs' arguments that they, and not the defendants, are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-52 
(1986). 
 
       A. Whether the IDEA Required Radnor to Implement 
       Michael's Washington IEP 
 
In enacting the IDEA, Congress made known its strong 
preference for integrating students with disabilities into 
regular classrooms, and against segregating such students 
from their non-disabled peers unless absolutely necessary 
to provide them with an educational benefit. See 20 U.S.C. 
S 1412(a)(5)(A); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988); 
Oberti v. Board of Educ. of Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 
995 F.2d 1204, 1213-14 (3d Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, cases 
presenting the reverse situation occasionally arise, where 
the complaint is the school district's failure to segregate a 
child from his or her non-disabled peers by placing that 
child in a learning environment serving only disabled 
students. This is such a case. 
 
The plaintiffs contend that the defendants' refusal to 
adopt Michael's Washington IEP and to implement that IEP 
by placing him in the segregated Hill Top school, as 
opposed to a more integrated learning program at Radnor 
High, violated the IDEA's "pendency" or "stay-put" 
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provision. This provision, found at 20 U.S.C. S 1415(j), 
states in pertinent part: 
 
       . . . [D]uring the pendency of any proceedings 
       conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or 
       local educational agency and the parents or guardian 
       otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then- 
       current educational placement of such child, or, if 
       applying for initial admission to a public school, shall, 
       with the consent of the parents or guardian, be placed 
       in the public school program until all such proceedings 
       have been completed.4 
 
Plaintiffs argue that when Michael moved to Radnor 
Township, the LAB School in Washington was Michael's 
"then-current educational placement," and Radnor 
educational authorities' process of evaluating his 
educational needs constituted pending proceedings. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs contend that Radnor was obligated 
during this time to implement Michael's Washington IEP, 
and that this required placing him at Hill Top, a private 
school, which they assert provided the educational program 
most similar to the one Michael received at the LAB School. 
 
The district court agreed with the local hearing officer, 
the state appeals board, and the defendants that the IDEA 
is silent on how to apply the pendency provision when a 
student transfers from another state. It therefore accorded 
deference to the federal OSEP Policy Memorandum 96-5. 
That memorandum states in pertinent part: 
 
       [E]ntitlement to a [free appropriate public education, 
       or] FAPE, by its terms, encompasses an appropriate 
       educational program that is individually-designed for 
       each student in accordance with the requirements of 
       Part B [of IDEA] and the educational standards of the 
       State in which the student's parents reside. In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In 1997, Congress amended the IDEA. These amendments, which for 
the most part became effective on June 4, 1997, substantially 
reorganized the statute. They also slightly modified the stay-put 
provision, which previously was found at 20 U.S.C.S 1415(e)(3)(A). 
However, the 1997 amendments do not appear to have altered this 
provision in any way relevant to this appeal. 
 
                                7 
  
       addition, under 34 C.F.R. S 300.600, each State must 
       exercise a general supervision over all programs in the 
       State that provide educational services to disabled 
       students, and must ensure that all such programs 
       meet State education standards and Part B 
       requirements. 
 
        When a student moves from a school district in State 
       A to a school district in State B, the State B school 
       district first must ascertain whether it will adopt the 
       most recent evaluation and IEP developed for the 
       student by the State A school district. Since the State 
       A school district's evaluation and IEP were based in 
       part on the educational standards and eligibility 
       requirements of State A, the student's evaluation and 
       IEP developed by the State A school district might not 
       necessarily be consistent with the educational 
       standards of State B. Therefore, the State B school 
       district must determine, as an initial matter, whether 
       it believes that the student has a disability and 
       whether the most recent evaluation of the student 
       conducted by the school district in State A and the 
       State A school district's IEP meet the requirements of 
       Part B and well as the educational standards of State 
       B. 
 
OSEP Policy Memorandum 96-5, reprinted in 24 Indiv. 
Disabil. Educ. L. Rptr. 320 (U.S. Dep't Educ. Dec. 6, 1995). 
The district court therefore held that the pendency 
provision did not require implementation of Michael's 
Washington IEP. 
 
On appeal, plaintiffs make two arguments. First, they 
contend that the OSEP Policy Memorandum is not entitled 
to deference because the plain language of the pendency 
provision and federal judicial and administrative decisions 
interpreting this provision dictate a contrary result. Second, 
they argue that regardless of the interpretation given the 
IDEA's pendency provision, Pennsylvania regulations, 
which the IDEA incorporates into its scheme, contain a 
broader pendency requirement, and the Pennsylvania 
pendency regulation dictates a contrary result. Radnor and 
PDE dispute these arguments, and in addition contend that 
because no "proceedings" under section 1415 were pending 
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while Michael resided in Radnor Township, the stay-put 
provision is inapplicable. We address these arguments in 
order. 
 
1. Application of the IDEA's Stay-Put Provision 
 
In interpreting a congressional enactment, a court must 
first " `determine whether the language at issue has a plain 
and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular 
dispute in the case.' " Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 
138, 146 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc) (quoting Robinson v. Shell 
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)). "The plainness or 
ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference 
to the language itself, the specific context in which that 
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as 
a whole." Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340. The IDEA is silent on 
how its pendency provision is to be applied to students who 
transfer interstate versus students who transfer intrastate, 
and the plain language of the pendency provision is at best 
ambiguous with respect to this issue. On its face, it is not 
clear that Congress intended the requirement that a 
student remain in his or her "then-current educational 
placement" to apply to students who relocate from one state 
to another. For example, a student's prior placement no 
longer seems "current" after he or she withdraws from that 
placement and moves away. Moreover, it is impossible for 
the student's new school district in Pennsylvania to keep 
the student in his or her previous school as required by the 
"stay put" provision where that school is in another state. 
Therefore, we must look beyond the isolated text of section 
1415(j) for guidance on how to apply this provision in this 
case. See, e.g., United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 
679 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
OSEP is the agency charged with principal responsibility 
for administering the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. S 1402(a). The 
portion of OSEP Policy Memorandum 96-5 relevant to this 
case is properly characterized as an interpretive rule 
because it imposes no substantive obligations, but rather 
clarifies that the IDEA's pendency provision does not apply 
to situations where a student moves from one state to 
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another. See Bailey v. Sullivan, 885 F.2d 52, 62 (3d Cir. 
1989) (en banc).5 
 
The district court deferred to OSEP Policy Memorandum 
96-5, citing Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). This court has 
held that the level of deference to be accorded such 
interpretive rules depends upon their persuasiveness. 
"Admittedly, [they] do not rise to the level of a regulation 
and do not have the effect of law. A court is not required to 
give effect to an administrative interpretation. . .. Instead, 
the level of deference given to an interpretive bulletin is 
governed by the bulletin's persuasiveness." Brooks v. Village 
of Ridgefield Park, 185 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(citations omitted). See Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center 
for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 182 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(deferring to HHS directive interpreting Hyde Amendment 
restricting use of Medicaid funds to fund abortions, and 
holding that HHS interpretation preempted Pennsylvania 
law), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1093 (1996); see also Honig, 
484 U.S. at 325 n.8 (according deference to OSEP policy 
letter setting forth agency's interpretation of phrase "change 
in placement" in IDEA's predecessor statute). 
 
The conclusion expressed in OSEP Policy Memorandum 
96-5 that one state need not automatically accept and 
implement an IEP developed by another state does not 
appear to conflict with any previous or subsequent position 
taken by that agency. As we now discuss in greater detail, 
because this aspect of the policy memorandum is well- 
reasoned and persuasive in that it comports with the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. As it did before the district court, Radnor takes issue with portions 
of 
the OSEP Policy Memorandum suggesting that where a disabled student 
with a functioning IEP in State A moves to State B, State B authorities 
should follow a procedure for interim assessment and program 
implementation prescribed therein. Although Radnor asserts that it 
satisfied OSEP's suggested procedures in this case, it contends that 
OSEP lacks authority under IDEA to impose these affirmative 
requirements on school districts. It is unnecessary for us to reach this 
issue, however (see Op. at 6 n.7; Radnor Br. at 18-19), and we express 
no opinion on these portions of OSEP's memorandum. Rather, our 
analysis is restricted to the memorandum's conclusion that one state 
need not adopt and implement an IEP developed by another state. 
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IDEA's statutory and regulatory scheme and with precedent 
interpreting that scheme, we are persuaded that the district 
court did not err in its thoughtful analysis and conclusion 
to defer to the memorandum.6 
 
There are strong reasons for that deference and the result 
reached by the district court. The IDEA recognizes that 
education is traditionally a state function. Accordingly, it 
leaves the responsibility of providing a free appropriate 
public education, or "FAPE," to students with disabilities to 
state and local educational authorities. See 20 U.S.C. 
S 1400(c)(6) (1998); 20 U.S.C. S 1400(b)(8) (1996); 34 C.F.R. 
SS 300.13, 300.600 (1999). Provision of a FAPE requires 
that special education and related services must"meet the 
standards of the State educational agency," and must 
"include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or 
secondary school education in the State involved." 20 
U.S.C. S 1401(8) (1998); 20 U.S.C. S 1401(18) (1996). Under 
current section 1412, States are eligible for federal financial 
assistance only when the state demonstrates that it"has in 
effect policies and procedures to ensure that it meets" the 
conditions imposed, including that it makes available a 
FAPE to children with disabilities residing in that state. 20 
U.S.C. S 1412(a) (1998). A local educational authority is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Citing to 20 U.S.C. S 1407(f), plaintiffs argue that the 1997 IDEA 
amendments make clear that OSEP's policy statements are not entitled 
to the force of law. Presumably, plaintiffs intended to cite to S 1406(f), 
which states that where the Secretary responds to an inquiry regarding 
a policy, question, or interpretation under Part B of the IDEA, that 
response "shall include an explanation that the written response-- 
 
(1) is provided as informal guidance and is not legally binding; and 
 
(2) represents an interpretation by the Department  of Education of the 
applicable statutory or regulatory requirements in the context of the 
specific facts presented." 
 
Assuming that Policy Memorandum 96-5 is the type of response 
referred to by this provision, section 1406(f) merely imposes a 
requirement that the DOE response put readers on notice that it is not 
legally binding. This requirement, which was not effective when OSEP 
published Policy Memorandum 96-5, does not prevent us from 
considering DOE policy statements to be persuasive and therefore 
worthy of deference. 
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eligible to receive these federal funds only if it "has in effect 
policies, procedures, and programs that are consistent with 
the State policies and procedures established under section 
1412." 20 U.S.C. S 1413 (1998). 
 
Because Congress left primary responsibility for providing 
a FAPE and for implementing the IDEA to the states, we 
believe it unlikely that Congress intended the stay-put 
provision, which dates back to 1975 and the IDEA's 
predecessor statute, to impose a requirement on states that 
they must implement an IEP established in another state 
without considering how consistent that IEP is with the 
policies and mandates of the student's new residential 
state. 
 
Precedent interpreting the IDEA's pendency requirement 
supports this interpretation. As the parties observe, the 
stay-put provision was intended to serve as a type of 
"automatic preliminary injunction" preventing local 
educational authorities from unilaterally changing a 
student's existing educational program. See Drinker v. 
Colonial School Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864 (3d Cir. 1996). 
Where the student's existing IEP calls for public school 
placement with educational supports to compensate for the 
child's disability, the stay-put provision may require that 
local educational authorities not unilaterally attempt to alter 
the IEP by placing the child in segregated, non-regular 
education classes. See, e.g., Honig, 484 U.S. at 323-28; 
Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1220-24. Conversely, where the 
student's existing IEP requires placement in a private 
school, the stay-put provision may require that local 
authorities not unilaterally attempt to alter the IEP by 
placing the student in a public, regular education classes. 
See Drinker, 78 F.3d at 867; Jarczynski v. St. Mary's 
County Pub. Sch., 29 Indiv. Disabil. Educ. L. Rep. 49 (D. 
Md. Oct. 13, 1998). 
 
However, where a parent unilaterally removes a child 
from an existing placement determined in accordance with 
state procedures, and puts the child in a different 
placement that was not assigned through proper state 
procedures, the protections of the stay-put provision are 
inoperative until the state or local educational authorities 
and the parents agree on a new placement. See Susquenita 
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Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S., 96 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1996).7 Only 
once state authorities and parents have reached such 
agreement does a "then-current educational placement" 
come into existence. Id. In the instant case, it is Michael's 
father who unilaterally removed Michael from the LAB 
School when he moved the family to Radnor Township. 
Neither Washington educational authorities nor 
Pennsylvania authorities played any role in this decision. 
The plaintiffs now claim that upon moving to Pennsylvania, 
Radnor should have placed Michael at the Hill Top School 
rather than at Radnor High. However, his father never 
reached any agreement with Radnor or with other 
Pennsylvania educational authorities that Michael should 
be placed in a segregated, private school. Therefore, 
Michael had no "then-current educational placement" in the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the stay-put provision 
provides no relief for him. 
 
We hold that the IDEA's overall scheme and the 
precedent interpreting that scheme leads inexorably to the 
conclusion that when a student moves from State A to 
State B, any prior IEP in effect in State A need not be 
treated by State B as continuing automatically in effect. 
This interpretation of the inapplicability of the stay-put 
provision may, as plaintiffs claim, lead to the initial result 
that "disabled students like Michael with comprehensive 
and long-standing IEP's . . . can be forced upon an 
interstate move to somehow cope in regular education 
without supports while the district and the parent resolve 
any IEP dispute." (Appellant's Br. at 14 (emphasis in 
original)). But if parents believe that private school 
placement remains the only way to provide the student with 
the educational benefit required by the IDEA, or otherwise 
disagree with an IEP proposal, they can place the child in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We note that this scenario is distinguishable from the situation in 
which a parent unilaterally removes a child previously determined to be 
disabled from one school district and moves the child to another school 
district in the same state. In the latter situation, the child's 
educational 
placement has already been determined in accordance with state 
procedures and with the consent of the child's parents, and his or her 
IEP bears the imprimatur of that state. See Inquiry of Rieser, OSEP 
Policy Letter, July 17, 1986 (U.S. Dep't Educ. 1986). 
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a private school, initiate a due process hearing, and seek 
reimbursement from educational authorities later. 8 See 
Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 
(1993); School Comm. of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. 
Department of Educ. of Commonwealth of Mass., 471 U.S. 
359, 369-73 (1985). Of course, they act at their own 
financial risk, and will recover only if they are correct that 
local authorities have failed to provide the educational 
program to which their child is entitled under the IDEA. 
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373-74. The plaintiffs' contention 
that these parents would have to keep paying private school 
tuition out of pocket for "years" is meritless, as federal and 
state regulations impose strict timing requirements on the 
completion of evaluations, the development and 
implementation of IEPs, and review of challenges to a local 
educational authority's proposal or refusal to initiate or 
change the identification, evaluation, or educational 
placement of a child or the provision of FAPE to a child. See 
34 C.F.R. SS 300.504(a), 300.512; 22 Pa. CodeSS 14.25(m), 
342.25(p) (timeline for completion of multidisciplinary 
evaluations); 22 Pa. Code. S 14.32(i) (timeline for 
preparation and implementation of IEPs); 22 Pa. Code 
SS 14.63, 14.64(o) (timelines for requesting and holding 
prehearing conference or due process hearing). We are 
mindful that this interpretation may bind the hands of 
parents who cannot afford to pay private school tuition out- 
of-pocket and await future reimbursement. This same 
result, however, can occur where parents of a student who 
transfers intrastate disagree with the new school district's 
placement of their child, and appears to be an unfortunate 
reality of the system Congress created. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the interpretation adopted by 
OSEP in Policy Memorandum 96-5 is a reasonable 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Because Pennsylvania never established an IEP for Michael, it is not 
certain that Radnor's interim educational plan for Michael was 
inappropriate. The administrative hearing officer concluded that the 
interim options proposed by Radnor would have closely approximated 
the placement Michael received at the LAB School. The district court 
found that this conclusion was supported by substantial evidence on the 
record as a whole (Op. at 8 n.10), and plaintiffs have not appealed this 
determination. 
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accommodation of the stay-put provision and the overriding 
purposes and structure of the IDEA, and we are persuaded 
that this interpretation deserves deference.9 
 
       2. Pennsylvania's Regulatory Pendency Requirement 
 
Nevertheless, even though the IDEA's stay-put provision 
does not provide a basis for relief, "[f]ederal law 
incorporates state standards, and a school district may 
violate the IDEA if it fails to satisfy the more stringent state 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We note that an additional reason for adopting OSEP's interpretation 
of the stay-put provision, not asserted by the parties, may lie in the 
limited congressional authority under which the provision was originally 
enacted. The stay-put provision dates back to 1975, when it was enacted 
as section 615(e)(3) of the IDEA's predecessor statute, the Education for 
All Handicapped Children Act. See Pub. L. No. 94-142, 1975 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (89 Stat.) 773, 789. Congressional authority for passage of 
this statute derived from its spending power, U.S. Const. art. I, S 8, and 
that act functioned by conditioning state and local educational 
authorities' eligibility for federal funds upon their satisfaction of 
certain 
conditions favorable to education of disabled students. See Board of 
Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 
204 n.26 (1982). The Supreme Court has stated that"if Congress 
intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do 
so unambiguously." Id. (quoting Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 
451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). 
 
However, we note one wrinkle in this analysis. The 1997 amendments 
to the IDEA altered the statute's "findings" provision to include language 
invoking the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
18 U.S.C. S 1400(c)(6)-(10). This addition of the Fourteenth Amendment 
as a constitutional basis for passage of the 1997 IDEA amendments may 
undercut this spending power argument. Nevertheless, after the 1997 
amendments, the stay-put provision remained substantially identical to 
its previous text, was placed in "Part B" (subchapter II) of the amended 
statute, which is entitled "Assistance for Education of All Children with 
Disabilities," Pub L. No. 105-17, 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (111 Stat.) 37, 49, 
and continued to appear in 20 U.S.C. S 1415, subpart (a) of which 
explicitly states that the procedures established by that section are 
conditions imposed upon "[a]ny State educational agency, State agency, 
or local educational agency that receives assistance under this 
subchapter." 
 
Regardless, the parties have not raised or briefed this argument, and 
we do not rely on it in deciding this appeal. 
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law requirements." Frith v. Galeton Area Sch. Dist., 900 F. 
Supp. 706, 712 n.9 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (citing Doe v. Board of 
Educ. of Tullahoma City Sch., 9 F.3d 455, 457 (6th Cir. 
1993) (per curiam), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1108 (1994)); see 
also Board of Educ. of East Windsor Regional Sch. Dist. v. 
Diamond, 808 F.2d 987, 992 (3d Cir. 1986). The plaintiffs 
argue that a Pennsylvania regulation imposes a more 
stringent pendency requirement than that imposed by IDEA 
itself or by DOE regulations. The regulation in question 
states: 
 
       No change in the identification, evaluation, educational 
       placement or IEP of an exceptional student or an 
       eligible young child may be made during the pendency 
       of an administrative or judicial proceeding unless 
       agreed upon by the parties to the proceeding. 
 
22 Pa. Code S 14.61(b). 
 
The plaintiffs contend that this regulation's prohibition 
on changes in a child's "identification, evaluation, 
educational placement, or IEP" is broader than the federal 
prohibition on changes in a child's "then-current 
educational placement," and that this broader sweep 
includes evaluations and IEP's from other states. One 
federal district court has noted in dictum that the 
Pennsylvania regulation is "much more prohibitive than its 
federal counterpart" in that S 14.64(b) prohibits re- 
evaluation during the pendency of proceedings, whereas the 
federal stay-put provision only prohibits a change in 
educational placement. See Delaware County Intermediate 
Unit # 25 v. Martin & Melinda K., 831 F. Supp. 1206, 1223 
n.25 (E.D. Pa. 1993). However, two other federal courts, 
including this court, have noted that the requirements of 
S 14.64(b) "track" the federal standard. See Drinker, 78 F.3d 
at 864 n.11; Matthew K. v. Parkland Sch. Dist., No. Civ. A. 
97-6636, 1998 WL 84009, at *5 n.6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 
1998). 
 
The district court rejected Michael's contention, holding 
that "the Pennsylvania regulations are silent on accepting 
out of state IEP's." (Op. at 7 n.8). We believe the district 
court was right to do so for two reasons. First, 
Pennsylvania regulations contain a provision expressly 
requiring that: 
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       If an exceptional student moves from one school 
       district in this Commonwealth to another, the new 
       district shall implement the existing IEP to the extent 
       possible or shall provide the services and programs 
       specified in an interim IEP agreed to by the parents 
       until a new IEP is developed and implemented in 
       accordance with this [and other] sections[ ] . . . and 
       until the completion of due process proceedings . . . . 
 
22 Pa. Code. S 14.31(c). The existence of this specific 
regulatory provision is significant because a parallel 
provision dealing with students who move from another 
state to a school district in Pennsylvania, and who had 
previously been educated in accordance with an IEP 
developed in that other state, is conspicuously absent from 
these regulations. This absence evidences a lack of intent 
on the part of Pennsylvania regulators to address Michael's 
situation. 
 
Second, the Pennsylvania appeals panel, the highest 
administrative authority of the Commonwealth to opine in 
this case, concluded that because the federal pendency 
provision did not apply, once plaintiffs rejected Radnor's 
interim IEP offer, "Michael was considered a regular 
education student." (A.119a). Presumably, had this state 
administrative panel construed Pennsylvania regulations to 
mandate implementation of the Washington IEP, it would 
have so held in its analysis.10 
 
Accordingly, we hold that Pennsylvania regulations do 
not require a Pennsylvania school district such as Radnor 
to implement the IEP formulated in another state. 
 
       3. "Proceedings" 
 
In addition, even if we did interpret the IDEA's stay-put 
provision to require a state to implement an IEP developed 
by another state, this provision is not applicable in this 
case because by its terms, it applies only to attempts to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. In addition, the local hearing officer directly rejected plaintiffs' 
argument, finding that Pennsylvania's regulations are merely 
"clarifications of how to implement the federal IDEA requirements within 
Pennsylvania." (A.127a-28a). 
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alter a student's current educational placement "during the 
pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this 
section." 20 U.S.C. S 1415(j) (emphasis added). (See Radnor 
Br. at 9; PDE Br. at 14). Radnor and PDE contend that the 
earliest proceeding that can be conducted pursuant to 
section 1415 is a due process hearing (conducted pursuant 
to section 1415(f)), and that since Michael had already 
moved to New Jersey when he requested a due process 
hearing, no proceeding "conducted pursuant to" section 
1415 was pending at the time he resided in Radnor 
Township. 
 
The district court rejected this argument, holding that 
proceedings under section 1415 included "the opportunity 
of the parent or guardian to inspect relevant records with 
respect to the child's evaluation, and the notice 
requirement the school district must satisfy when making 
the initial placement decision," both of which had begun 
while Michael lived in Radnor Township. (Op. at 4 n.4). The 
district court characterized these as "proceedings set forth 
in S 1415(b)," and noted that both "are part of the process 
by which a school district changes a student's placement, 
but by definition occur before the start of a due process 
hearing." 
 
In this respect, the district court was mistaken. The types 
of proceedings dealt with in section 1415(b), which include 
the conduct and development of evaluations, eligibility 
determinations, IEPs, and educational placement, arise 
under section 1414. Section 1415(b) merely sets forth 
"procedures" to be observed during these "proceedings." 
Therefore, no proceedings conducted pursuant to section 
1415 were pending during the time Radnor offered to place 
Michael in Radnor High and his father instead placed him 
at Hill Top.11 See Verhoeven v. Brunswick Sch. Comm., ___ 
F.3d ___, No. 98-2348, 1999 WL 721698, at *5 (1st Cir. 
Sept. 21, 1999) (stay-put provision applies during pendency 
of "administrative and judicial proceedings challenging a 
placement decision"); Kari H. v. Franklin Special Sch. Dist., 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We do not address whether the mediation procedures codified at 
section 1415(e) by the 1997 IDEA amendments qualify as "proceedings 
conducted pursuant to" section 1415 under the pendency requirement. 
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Nos. 96-5066 and 96-5178, 1997 WL 468326, at *6 (6th 
Cir. Aug. 12 1997) (per curiam) (only three types of 
proceedings arise under section 1415 -- due process 
hearings, state administrative review, and civil judicial 
review actions in state or federal court).12 
 
Because we conclude that neither the stay-put provision 
nor Pennsylvania regulations required Radnor to implement 
Michael's Washington IEP, and that no proceedings were 
pending in Pennsylvania while Michael resided there, we 
therefore hold that plaintiffs' claim for reimbursement 
under the IDEA must fail.13 
 
B. Michael's Constitutional Right to Travel 
 
The plaintiffs also contend that Radnor's failure to 
implement Michael's Washington IEP violated their 
Fourteenth Amendment right to travel interstate by denying 
Michael benefits that would be afforded to a disabled 
student who transferred intrastate, from one Pennsylvania 
school district to another. We disagree.14  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. See also Drinker, 78 F.3d at 863-64 (noting that stay-put provision 
applies during impartial due process hearing on parents' complaints 
regarding educational placement of handicapped children, and during 
state or federal judicial review of final administrative proceedings, 
without comment about provision's application to earlier proceedings 
involving local educational authorities); Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 
72 (2d Cir. 1990) (implying that pending "proceedings" means due 
process proceedings under section 1415); Smith v. Roher, Civ. A. No. 89- 
3258, 1991 WL 132545, at *1 (D.D.C. July 10, 1991) (stay-put provision 
applies once process of administrative review of placement decision is 
commenced and remains in effect through completion of civil action in 
district court). 
 
13. Although it does not appear that plaintiffs have appealed their claim 
under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. S 794, we note that the district 
court correctly concluded that this claim is derivative of their IDEA 
claim 
(Op. at 9), and therefore this claim too must fail. 
 
14. In addition to granting summary judgment in favor of both 
defendants on this claim, the district court also dismissed plaintiffs' 
S 1983 claim as to PDE based on that defendant's Eleventh Amendment 
immunity. (Op. at 2 n.3). The plaintiffs have not argued that this 
decision was erroneous, and we therefore do not consider that ruling 
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The Court has described the constitutional right to travel 
as embracing at least three components: (1) the right of a 
citizen of one state to enter and leave another state; (2) the 
right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an 
unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second 
state; and (3) for those travelers who elect to become 
permanent residents, the right to be treated like citizens of 
that state. See Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 1525 (1999). 
The plaintiffs contend that the last of these components is 
violated by Radnor's refusal to honor Michael's Washington 
IEP. They base this assertion on the testimony of Radnor's 
Director of Special Education that, had Michael been a 
Pennsylvania resident who merely moved from another 
Pennsylvania school district to Radnor, an IEP calling for 
private placement would have been honored. (A.154a). 
 
Adoption of the policy enunciated in OSEP Policy 
Memorandum 96-5, however, does not cause Michael to be 
treated differently from other Pennsylvania residents. Every 
student in Pennsylvania identified as disabled is entitled to 
an evaluation, an IEP, and if warranted, a special 
placement, in accordance with Pennsylvania procedures. 
Had Michael been a Pennsylvania resident transferring to 
Radnor from another Pennsylvania district, where he had 
already been identified as disabled and was being educated 
in accordance with an IEP developed there, he would have 
already submitted to these procedures. The District 
Director of Special Education's testimony that Radnor 
would have honored an IEP developed under such 
circumstances flows logically from this view and in no way 
affects plaintiffs' right to travel interstate. 
 
Michael transferred from Washington, and had not yet 
undergone an evaluation in accordance with Pennsylvania 
procedures, as every other disabled student enrolled in 
Pennsylvania had. Therefore, in requiring that a new IEP be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
presented for our review. Accordingly, we discuss the plaintiffs' S 1983 
claim as against Radnor only. Moreover, we do not address PDE's 
additional argument that Michael has not adequately alleged that any 
PDE official was involved in the decision not to honor his Washington, 
D.C. IEP. 
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developed, Radnor's treatment of Michael was not 
inconsistent with its treatment of Pennsylvania residents. 
Indeed, only by submitting to these procedures could 
Pennsylvania determine if Michael even had a right (under 
the IDEA) to a private placement. Pennsylvania decided 
that, at least on an interim basis, Michael had no such 
right, and his educational needs could instead be met in a 
structured public school placement. We need not pass on 
the merits of that decision. See supra note 8. 
 
Arguably, requiring a disabled student who has 
undergone evaluation and IEP development in a different 
state to submit to this process a second time upon moving 
to a new state possibly may deter the student and his 
family from moving to the new state. However, an otherwise 
constitutional law that incidentally discourages migration is 
not necessarily rendered suspect or invalid merely because 
of such incidental effect. See Lawrence H. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law S 15-14, at 1381 (2d ed. 1988). 
 
Michael has a right, established by the IDEA and defined 
by state law, to a free, appropriate public education. 
Radnor has done nothing to alter or deny Michael that 
right. It has not imposed different standards on the type of 
education Michael may receive versus the type of education 
a disabled student who moves from one school district to 
another within Pennsylvania may receive. Thus, Michael 
cannot claim that Radnor's action in this case violated his 
right to travel under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and consequently, cannot claim a 




For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court 
granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and 
denying summary judgment for the plaintiffs will be 
affirmed. 
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